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Abstract
Wolfram’s Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE) implies
that universal complexity abounds in nature. This paper comprises
three sections. In the first section we consider the question why there
are so many universal phenomena around. So, in a sense, we seek a
driving force behind the PCE if any. We postulate a principle GNS
that we call the Generalized Natural Selection principle that together
with the Church-Turing thesis is seen to be equivalent in a sense to a
weak version of PCE. In the second section we ask the question why
we do not observe any phenomena that are complex but not-universal.
We choose a cognitive setting to embark on this question and make
some analogies with formal logic.
In the third and final section we report on a case study where we
see rich structures arise everywhere.
1 Why complexity abounds
Throughout the literature one can find various different and sometimes con-
tradicting definitions of what complexity is. The definition that we shall
employ in the first section involves the notion of a universal computational
process/device. For the second and third section of this paper we shall use
slightly less formal and more relaxed notions of the word complexity.
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1.1 What is complexity?
Let us recall that a computational process Π is universal if it can simulate
any other computational process Θ. In other words, Π is universal if for any
other computational process Θ, we can find an easy coding protocol C and
decoding protocol C−1 so that we can encode any input x for Θ as an input
C(x) for Π so that after Π has performed its computation we can decode
the answer Π(C(x)) to the answer that Θ would have given us. In symbols:
C−1(Π(C(x))) = Θ(x).
For the sake of this first section we can take as working definition that a
system is complex if we can easily perceive it as a universal computational
process. Note that we have used the word ‘easy’ a couple of times above.
If we were to be more precise we should specify this and could for example
choose for poly-time or some other technical notion that more or less covers
the intuition of what is easy. We wish to be not too specific on these kind of
details here.
Thus, for the first section of this paper, a complex process is one that is
computationally universal. However, great parts of the reasoning here will
also hold for other definitions of complexity. For example, stating that a
process is complex if comprehending or describing it exceeds or supersedes
all available resources (time, space, description size).
Note that our current definition of complexity need not necessarily man-
ifest itself in a complex way. Remember that a universal process is one
that can simulate any other process, thus also including the very simple and
repetitive ones. One might thus equally well observe a universal process that
temporarily exhibits very regular behavior. In this sense universal cannot be
directly equated to our intuitive notion of complexity but rather to potentially
complex.
1.2 The Principle of Computational Equivalence and
the Church-Turing thesis
In his NKS book [14], Wolfram postulates the Principle of Computational
Equivalence (PCE):
PCE: Almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be
viewed as computations of equivalent and maximal sophistication.
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The processes here referred to are processes that occur in nature, or at
least, processes that could in principle be implemented in nature. Thus,
processes that require some oracle or black box that give the correct answer
to some hard questions are of course not allowed here.
As noted in the book, PCE implies the famous Church-Turing Thesis
(CT):
CT: Everything that is algorithmically computable is computable
by a Turing Machine.
In Section 3 below we shall briefly revisit the definition of a Turing Ma-
chine. Both theses have some inherent vagueness in that they try to cap-
ture/define an intuitive notion. While the CT thesis aims at defining the
intuitive notion of algorithmic computability, PCE aims at defining what de-
grees of complexity occur in natural processes. But note, this is not a mere
definition as, for example, the notion of what is algorithmically computable
comes with a clear intuitive meaning. And thus, the thesis applies to all such
systems that fall under our intuitive meaning. As a consequence, the CT
thesis would become false if some scientists were to point out an algorithmic
computation that cannot be performed on a Turing Machine with unlimited
time and space resources. With the development and progress of scientific
discovery the thesis has to be questioned and tested time and again. And this
is actually what we have seen over the past decades with the invention and
systematic study of new computational paradigms like DNA computing [11],
quantum computing [10], membrane computing [4], etc. Most scientists still
adhere to the CT thesis. There are some highly theoretical notions of super-
computations and super-tasks which would allegedly escape the CT thesis
but to my modest esteem, they depend too much on very strong assumptions
and seem impossible to be implemented [12]. However, I would love to be
proven wrong in this and see such a super-computer be implemented.
In the PCE there is moreover a vague quantification present in that the
principle speaks of almost all. This vague quantification is also essential.
Trying to make it more precise is an interesting and challenging enterprise.
However, one should not expect a definite answer in the form of a definition
here. Rather, I think, the question is a guideline that points out interesting
philosophical issues as we shall argue in Section 2. Moreover, these vague
quantifiers could be read in other parts of science too. For example, the Sec-
ond Law of Thermodynamics tells us that all isolated macroscopic processes
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in nature are going in the direction that leads to an increase of entropy.
First of all, it is per definition not possible to observe perfectly isolated
macroscopic processes. So, in all practical applications of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics we would have to comfort ourselves with a highly isolated
macroscopic process instead. And then, we know, as a matter of fact that
we should read a vague quantifier to the effect that almost all such processes
lead to an increase of entropy. A notable exception is given by processes
that involve living organisms. Of course one can debate here to what extent
higher-level living organisms can occur in a highly isolated environment. But
certainly lower-level living organisms like colonies of protozoans can occur in
relative isolation thus at least locally violating the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics. (See [2] and [13] for different viewpoints on whether life violates
the Second Law of Thermodynamics.)
It has been observed before in [14] that the PCE does imply the CT.
Note that PCE quantifies over all processes, be they natural or designed
by us. Thus in particular Turing Machines are considered by the PCE and
stipulated to have the maximal degree of computational sophistication which
implies the CT thesis.
But the PCE says more. It says that the space of possible degrees of com-
putational sophistication between obviously simple and universal is practi-
cally un-inhibited. In what follows we shall address the question what might
cause this. We put forward two observations. First we formulate a natural
candidate principle that can account for PCE and argue for its plausibility.
Second, we shall briefly address how cognition can be important. In partic-
ular, the way we perceive, interpret and analyze our environment could be
such that in a natural way it will not focus on intermediate degrees even if
they were there.
We would like to stress here that intermediate degrees refer to undecidable
yet not-universal to be on the safe side. There are various natural decidable
processes known that fall into different computational classes like P-time and
EXP-time processes which are known to be different classes.
In theoretical computer science there are explicit undecidable intermedi-
ate degrees known and the structure of such degrees is actually known to
be very rich. However, the processes that generate such degrees are very
artificial whence unlikely to be observed in nature. Moreover, although the
question about the particular outcome of these processes is known to yield in-
termediate degrees, various other aspects of these processes exhibit universal
complexity.
4
1.3 Complexity and Evolution
In various contexts but in particular in evolutionary processes one employs
the principle of Natural Selection, often also referred to as Survival of the
Fittest. These days basically everyone is familiar with this principle. It
is often described as species being in constant fight with each other over a
limited amount of resources. In this fight only those species that outperform
others will have access to the limited amount of resources, whence will be able
to pass on its reproductive code to next generations causing the selection.
We would like to generalize this principle to the setting of computations.
This leads us to what we call the principle of Generalized Natural Selection:
GNS: In nature, computational processes of high computational
sophistication are more likely to maintain/abide than processes
of lower computational sophistication.
If one sustains the view that all natural processes can be viewed as com-
putational ones, this generalization is readily made. For a computation, to
be executed, it needs access to the three main resources space, matter, and
time. If now one computation outperforms the other, it will win the battle
over access to the limited resources and abide. What does outperform mean
in this context?
Say we have two neighboring processes Π1 and Π2 that both need re-
sources to be executed. Thus, Π1 and Π2 will interfere with each other.
Stability of a process is thus certainly a requirement for survival. Moreover,
if Π1 can incorporate, or short-cut Π2 it can actually use Π2 for its survival.
A generalization of incorporating, or short-cutting is given by the notion of
simulation that we have given above. Thus, if Π1 can simulate Π2, it is more
likely to survive. In other words, processes that are of higher computational
sophistication are likely to outperform and survive processes of lower com-
putational sophistication. In particular, if the process Π1 is universal, it can
simulate any other process Π2 and thus is likely to use or incorporate any
such process Π2.
Of course this is merely a heuristic argument or an analogy rather than a
conclusive argument for the GNS principle. One can think of experimental
evidence where universal automata in the spirit of the Game of Life are run
next to and interacting with automata that generate regular or repetitive
patterns to see if, indeed, the more complex automata are more stable than
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the repetitive ones. However one cannot expect of course that experiments
and circumstantial evidence can substitute or prove the principle.
Just like the theory of the selfish gene (see [5]) shifted the scale on which
natural selection was to be considered, now GNS is an even more drastic
proposal and natural selection can be perceived to occur already on the lowest
possible level: individual small-scale computational processes.
We note that GNS only talks about computational processes in nature
and not in full generality about computational processes either artificial or
natural as was the case in PCE. Under some reasonable circumstances we
may see GNS as a consequence of PCE. For if ¬ GNS were true, there
would be no complex processes to witness after some time and this contradicts
PCE. Thus we have:
PCE =⇒ CT + GNS.
As we already mentioned, GNS only involves computational processes in na-
ture. Thus we cannot expect that CT+GNS is actually equivalent to PCE.
However, if we restrict PCE to talk only about processes in nature, let us
denote this by PCE′, then we do argue that we can expect a correspondence.
That is:
PCE′ ≈ CT + GNS.
But PCE′ tells us that almost all computational processes in nature are
either simple or universal. If we have GNS we find that more sophisti-
cated processes will outperform simpler ones and CT gives us an attainable
maximum. Thus the combination of them would yield that in the limit all
processes end up being complex. The question then arises, where do simple
processes come from? (Normally, the question is where do complex processes
come from, but in the formal setting of CT+GNS it is the simple processes
that are in need of further explanation.)
Simple processes in nature often have various symmetries. As we have
argued above these symmetries are readily broken when a simple system
interacts with a more complex one resulting in the simple system being ab-
sorbed in the more complex one. We see two main forces that favor simple
systems.
The first driving force is what we may call cooling down. For example,
temperature/energy going down, or material resources growing scarce. If
these resources are not available, the complex computations cannot continue
their course, breaking down and resulting in less complex systems.
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A second driving force may be referred to as scaling and invokes mech-
anisms like the Central Limit Theorem. The Central Limit Theorem is a
phenomenon that creates symmetry by repeating a process with stochastic
outcome a large number of times yielding the well-known Gaussian distribu-
tion. Thus the scale (number of repetitions) of the process determines the
amount of symmetry that is built up by phenomena that invoke the Central
Limit Theorem.
In the above, we have identified a driving force that creates complexity
(GNS) and two driving forces that creates simplicity: cooling down and
scaling. In the light of these two opposite forces we can restate PCE′ as
saying that simplicity and universality are the two main attractors of these
interacting forces.
Note that we deliberately do not speak of an equivalence between PCE′
and CT + GNS. Rather we speak of a correspondence. It is like when
modeling the movement of a weight on a spring on earth. The main driving
forces in this movement are gravitation and the tension of the spring. How-
ever, this does not fully determine a final equilibrium if we do not enter in
more details taking into account friction and the like. It is in the same spirit
that we should interpret the above mentioned correspondence.
However, there are two issues here that we wish to address. First, we
have argued that CT + GNS is in close correspondence to PCE′ which
is a weak version of PCE. What can be said about full PCE? In other
words, what about those processes that we naturally come up with? There
is clearly a strong cognitive component in the study of those processes that
we naturally come up with.
Second, PCE has a strong intrinsic implicit cognitive component as it
deals with the processes that we observe in nature and not necessarily the
ones that are out there. Admittedly, in its original formulation there is
no mention of this cognitive component in PCE but only the most radical
Platonic reading of PCE would deny that there is an intrinsic cognitive
component present.
We shall try to address both issues in the next section where we discuss
how cognition enters a treatment of PCE.
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2 Cognition and Complexity
In the first section we used a robust definition of complexity by saying a
process is complex if we can easily perceive it as a universal computational
process. In the current section we shall deliberately use a less formal and
rigorous definition.
2.1 Relative complexity
In the current section we say that a process is complex if comprehending
or describing it exceeds or supersedes all available resources (time, space,
description size). In doing so the relative nature of complexity becomes
apparent.
The relativity is not so much due to our underspecification when we
spoke of comprehension or description of a process. One can easily think
of formal interpretations of these words. For example, comprehension can
be substituted by obtaining a formal proof in a particular proof system.
Likewise, descriptions can be thought of as programs that reproduce or model
a process. However for the sake of the current argument it is not necessary
to enter into that much detail or formalization.
The relativity of the notion of complexity that we employ in this section
is merely reflected in how much resources are available. A problem or process
can be complex for one set of resources but easy for another.
For example, let us consider the currently known process/procedure Π
that decides whether or not a natural number is prime (see [1]). If we only
have quadratic time resources, then Π(n) is difficult as the current known
procedure is known to require an amount of time in the order of |n|12 (that
is, in the order of magnitude of the length of n (written in decimal notation)
to the power 12). Of course, if we allow polynomial time, then primality is
an easy problem.
This relativity is a rather trivial observation. The point that we wish
to make here however is more subtle and profound. So, we depart from the
observation that complexity is always relative to the framework in which it
is described/perceived. Now, the ultimate framework where all our formal
reasoning is embedded is our own framework of cognitive abilities. And this
has two important consequences.
Firstly, it implies that if we study how our cognitive framework deals with
complexity and related notions, we get a better understanding of the nature of
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the definitions of complexity that we come up with. And secondly, it strongly
suggests that various notions and definitions of complexity in various unre-
lated areas of science in the end are of the same nature. Thus, various formal
theorems that relate different notions of complexity, like ergodicity, entropy,
Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity, computational complexity etc. are expected
to be found. And as a matter of fact, in recent developments many such the-
orems have been proven. In the final section of this chapter we shall see a
new such and rather unexpected connection between two seemingly differ-
ent notions of complexity: fractal dimensions versus computational runtime
classes.
2.2 Cognitive diagonalization
In this section we wish to dwell a bit on the following simple observation:
as human beings we have a natural ability to consider a system in a more
complete and more complex framework if necessary. We shall give some ex-
amples of this in a formalized setting and pose the question how we naturally
generate more complex systems in a cognitive and less formal setting.
Suppose we study a system S with just an initial element –let us call that
0– and an operator S that gives us a next, new and unique element which
we call the successor. The smallest system of this kind can be conceived as
the natural numbers without further extra structure on them:
{0, S0, SS0, SSS0, . . .}.
If we study this system in a fairly simple language it turns out that all
questions about this systems are easily decidable by us.
Of course, we would not leave it there and move on to summarize certain
processes in this system. The process of repeating taking the successor a
number of times is readily introduced yielding our notion of addition defined
by x + 0 = x and x + Sy = S(x + y). So, by summarizing certain processes
in S we naturally arrive at a richer structure S ′ whose operations are S and
+.
If we now study S ′ in the same simple language as we used for S but now
with the additional symbol +, we see that all questions are still decidable.
That is, we can still find the answer to any question we pose about this system
in an algorithmic way. The time complexity of the algorithm is slightly higher
than that of S but the important thing is that it is still decidable.
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By a process similar to by which we went from S to S ′ we can now further
enrich our structure. We consider repeated addition to get to our well-known
definition of multiplication: x× 0 = 0 and x×Sy = x× y+x. The resulting
structure S ′′ has now three operations: S,+ and ×. However questions about
this structure in this language now turn out to be undecidable. That is, there
is no single algorithm that settles all questions about this structure in our
simple language.
The process by which we went from S to the more complex system S ′
and from S ′ to the more complex system S ′′ is called iteration. One may
think that this can only be repeated ω many times but we shall now describe
a more general process of gaining complexity which is called diagonalization
and of which iteration is just a special case. As an illustration of how this
works we shall give a proof of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem For each algorithmi-
cally enumerable theory T that only proves true statements and
that is of some minimal strength there is a true sentence ϕT that
is not provable in T .
Although Go¨del had a slightly different formulation of his First Incom-
pleteness Theorem in essence it is the one that we shall prove here. Our
proof will focus on the computable functions f(x) that T can prove to be
total. Thus, we focus on those unary functions f which are computable and
moreover, so that T proves that f is defined for each value of x. We shall
write
T ` ∀x ∃y f(x) = y
for the latter. As T is algorithmically enumerable, we can fix an enumeration
and just enumerate the proofs of T and stick with all the proofs pii that prove
some computable function fi to be total. Once we have a way to make this
list of functions fi we readily come up with a new computable function f
′
which is total but not provably so by T . We construct f ′ by what is called
diagonalization and it will soon become clear why this is called this way. We
can make a table of our functions fi with their values where we in anticipation
have displayed the diagonal in boldface.
We now define f ′(x) = fx(x) + 42. Clearly f ′ differs from any fi as it
differs on the diagonal. However, f ′ is clearly a total function and there is
also an easy algorithm to compute it: to compute f(x) we enumerate, using
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f0(0) f0(1) f0(2) f0(3) . . .
f1(0) f1(1) f1(2) f1(3) . . .
f2(0) f2(1) f2(2) f2(3) . . .
f3(0) f3(1) f3(2) f3(3) . . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
the fixed enumeration of the theorems of T , all proofs of T until we arrive at
pix. Then we compute fx(x) and add 42 to the result.
To summarize, we have provided a total computable function that is not
proven to be total by T whence T is incomplete. It is clear what minimal
requirements should be satisfied by T in order to have the proof go through.
For the main argument of this paper this proof of Go¨del’s First Incom-
pleteness Theorem is not entirely necessary. We have included it for two main
reasons. Firstly, of course, there is the beauty of the argument which is a
reason for itself. And second, the proof illustrates nicely how diagonalization
works.
In mathematical logic diagonalization is a widely used technique and a
universal way to obtain more complex systems. An interesting and important
question is, is there a natural cognitive counterpart of this? So, is there some
sort of universal cognitive construct –cognitive diagonalization if it were– that
always yields us a more complex framework in which to study a system. For
it is clear that we tend to add complexity to systems that we build and
perceive until it reaches the boundaries of our abilities. And thus we pose
the question if there is some universal and natural way by which we add this
complexity.
As an academic exercise one could try to rephrase diagonalization in a
setting of formalized cognition but that would yield a very artificial principle.
Moreover this will say nothing about what we actually do in our heads.
2.3 Cognition, complexity and evolution
Fodor has postulated a principle concerning our language. It says that (see
[6]) the structure and vocabulary of our language is such that it is efficient in
describing our world and dealing with the frame problem. The frame problem
is an important problem in artificial intelligence which deals with the problem
how to describe the world in an efficient way so that after a change in the
11
state of affairs no entirely new description of the world is needed.
On a similar page, we would like to suggest that our cognitive toolkit
has evolved over the course of time so that it best deals with the processes
it needs to deal with. Now, by PCE these processes are either universal or
very simple. Thus, it seems to make sense in terms of evolution to have a
cognitive toolkit that is well-suited to deal with just two kinds of processes:
the very simple ones and the universal ones.
Thus, it could well be that there actually are computational processes
out there that violate PCE just as there are chemical processes (life) that
locally violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics but that our cognitive
toolkit is just not well-equipped enough to deal with them.
This might also be related to the question we posed in the previous sec-
tion: how do we add complexity to a system? Let us continue the analogue
with formal logic. Diagonalization is currently the main universal tool for
adding strength to a system. However, there are various indications that
for many purposes diagonalization seems not to be fine-grained enough and
some scientists believe this is one of the main reasons why we have such
problems dealing with the famous P versus NP problem. Likewise, it might
be that cognitive diagonalization is not fine-grained enough to naturally ob-
serve/design intermediate degrees.
3 Complexity everywhere: small Turing ma-
chines
In this final section I will report on an ongoing project jointly with Fernando
Soler-Toscano and Hector Zenil. In this project we study the structures that
arise when one considers small Turing machines. Here, in this final section
we relax the working definition of complexity even further to just refer to
interesting structures.
In 2009 I attended the NKS summer school led by Stephan Wolfram in
Pisa, Italy. One of the main themes of NKS is that simple programs can
yield interesting and complex behavior. Being trained as a mathematician
and logician this did not at all shock my world view as there are various
simple functions or axiomatic systems known that yield very rich and complex
structures. However, when you start delving the computational universe
yourself it is that you get really excited about the NKS paradigm. It is
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not merely that there are various interesting systems out there, it is the
astonishing fact that these systems abound. And wherever you go and look
in the computable universe you find beautiful, intriguing and interesting
structures. In this final section I shall report on one of those explorations in
the computational universe.
The set-up of our experiment was inspired by an exploration performed
in [14] and we decided to look at small Turing-machines. There are various
definitions of Turing machines in the literature which all look alike. For us,
a Turing machine (TM) consist of a tape of cells where the tape extends
infinitely to the left and is bounded to the right. Each cell on the tape can
be either black (1) or white (0) and this start configuration is specified by
us. There is a head that moves over the tape and as it does so, the head can
be in one of finitely many states (like states of mind).
We have now specified the hardware of a TM. The software, so to say,
of a TM consists of a lookup table. This table tells the head what to do in
which situation. More concrete, depending on the state the head is in and
depending what symbol the head reads on the cell of the tape it is currently
visiting, it will perform an action as specified by the lookup table. This
action is very simple and consist of three parts: writing a symbol on the cell
it currently is at, moving the head one cell left or right and going to some
state of mind.
We only looked at small Turing machines that have either 2, 3 or 4 states
of mind. On those machines we defined a computation to start at the right-
most cell of the tape in State 0. We say the computation halts when the
head ‘drops off’ at the right-hand side of the tape. That is, when it is at
the border cell of the tape and receives a command to go one cell to the
right. We fed these TMs successive inputs that were coded in unary plus
one. Thus, input 0 was coded by just one black cell, input 1 was coded by
two consecutive black cells, and input n was coded by n+1 consecutive black
cells on an otherwise white tape.
With this set-up we looked at the different functions that were computed
by these small TMs and had a particular focus on the runtimes that occurred.
Of course, there are various fundamental issues to address that are mostly
related to either the Halting Problem (there is no algorithm that decides
whether a TM will halt on a certain input) or unfeasibility. Some of these
issues are addressed in [15].
When plotting the halting probability distribution for our TMs we ver-
ified a theoretical result by Calude to the effect that most TMs either halt
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quickly or they never halt at all ([3]). Although this result was expected
we did not expect the pronounced phase-transitions one can see in Figure
1 in the halting probability distributions that we found. In a sense, these
phase transitions are rudimentary manifestations of the low-level complexity
classes as described in [8].
Figure 1: Halting time distribution among TMs with three states and two
colors on the first 21 inputs.
Another striking feature that we found is that TMs tend to grow slower
if you give them more resources. Let us make this statement more precise.
We studied the behavior of all 4,096 TMs with two colors and two states (we
speak of the (2,2)-space). In total, they computed 74 different functions. We
also studied the behavior of all the 2,985,984 TMs with two colors and three
states where now 3,886 different functions were computed. Any function
that is computed in the (2,2)-space is easily seen to be also present in (3,2)-
space. We looked at the time needed to compute a function in the different
spaces. To our surprise we saw that almost always slow-down occurs. And
at all possible levels: slow-down on average, worst case, harmonic average,
asymptotically, etc. We only found very few cases of at most linear speed-up.
So the overall behavior of these small TMs revealed interesting structures
to us. But also looking at each particular TM showed interesting structures.
In Figure 2 we show two such examples. The rule numbering refers to Wol-
fram’s enumeration scheme for (2,2) space as explained in [14] and [7].
For TM number 2205 we have plotted the tape evolution for the first 6
entries. So, each gridded rectangle represents a complete computation for a
certain input. The diagrams should be interpreted as follows. The top row
represents the initial tape configuration. The white cells represent a zero
and the black cells a one. The grey cell represent the edge of the tape. Now
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each row in the gridded rectangle depicts the tape configuration after one
more step in the computation. That is why each row differs at at most one
cell from the previous row. We call these rectangles space-time diagrams of
our computation where the space/tape is depicted horizontally and the time
vertically.
We now see that TM 2205 always outputs just one black cell. Its com-
putation yields a space-time diagram with a very clear localized character
where the head has just moved from right to the left-end of the input and
back to the right end again doing some easy computation in between. TM
number 1351 shows a clear recursive structure. Curiously enough this ma-
chine computes a very easy function which is just the tape identity. So it
does a dazing amount of things (it needs exponential time for it) to leave in
the end (the bottom row) the tape in the exact same configuration as the
input (the top row). For more examples and structure we refer the interested
reader to [8].
Figure 2: Tape evolution for Rules 2205 (left) and 1351 (right).
Let us take a closer look at our pictures from Figure 2. It is clear that
each TM defines an infinite sequence of these space-time diagrams as each
different input defines such a diagram. It is pretty standard to assign to
this sequence of space-time diagrams a fractal dimension dτ that describes
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some features of the asymptotic behavior of a TM τ . We have empirically
established for all TMs in (2,2)-space a very curious correspondence. It turns
out that
The fractal dimension dτ that corresponds to a TM τ is 2 if and
only if τ computes in linear time. The dimension dτ is 1 if and
only if τ computes in exponential time.
This result is remarkable because it relates two completely different complex-
ity measures: the geometrical fractal dimension on the one side versus the
time complexity of a computation on the other side. The result is one out of
the many recent results that link various notions of complexity the existence
of which we already forecasted on philosophical grounds in Section 2.1.
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